Evidence verification
Each anchor commits a Merkle root over a range of the audit's tamper-evident event log. Two kinds of evidence are checked here, in your browser:
- IsoKron anchor receipt — signed by IsoKron's anchor service key (keys), over the auditor-signed checkpoint, with the service's own clock.
- Independent timestamps — RFC 3161 tokens from Sectigo and DigiCert, third-party timestamp authorities, over the SHA-256 of each receipt; signatures and certificate chains are checked against the pinned time-stamping CAs below. These do not depend on IsoKron.
Summary
Anchors
Verify offline
Every result on this page can be reproduced without this page, with Node ≥ 20 or OpenSSL 3. Replace PACK with the Evidence Pack directory, <anchor_id> and <tsa> (sectigo or digicert); each anchor below lists its exact commands.
npx -y kronicle-lite@0.10.1 verify-audit PACK --key-fingerprint <from your statement of work>
VERIFY.md lists every command with the pack's own file names. <tsa>.pem is the CA file built from the TSA's own repository (commands in the table below):openssl pkey -pubin -in auditor-key.pem -outform DER | shasum -a 256 # compare with the fingerprint in your report openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey auditor-key.pem -rawin -in SHA256SUMS -sigfile SHA256SUMS.sig shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS D=$(shasum -a 256 anchors/01-harness-frozen.receipt.json | cut -c1-64) openssl ts -verify -digest $D -in anchors/01-harness-frozen.<tsa>.tsr -CAfile <tsa>.pem -partial_chain
B=https://anchor.isokron.ai
curl -s $B/v1/receipts/<anchor_id> | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>process.stdout.write(JSON.parse(s).receipt_jcs))' > receipt.json
D=$(shasum -a 256 receipt.json | cut -c1-64)
curl -s -o <tsa>.tsr $B/v1/receipts/<anchor_id>/timestamps/<tsa>.tsr
# <tsa>.pem: the CA certificate from the TSA's own repository (commands in the table below)
openssl ts -verify -partial_chain -digest $D -in <tsa>.tsr -CAfile <tsa>.pem
openssl ts -reply -in <tsa>.tsr -text | grep 'Time stamp'
| TSA | Time-stamping CA | SHA-256 fingerprint |
|---|
-partial_chain makes the pinned CA file the trust anchor (OpenSSL 1.1 or later; on macOS use Homebrew openssl@3). Pass only that file: with a full system CA bundle, OpenSSL can follow the cross-signed root copies DigiCert embeds and report unable to get local issuer certificate. OpenSSL checks certificate validity at the current time; after a TSA certificate expires, add -attime with the token's time.